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Public perceptions are well established as a key factor in support for climate change
mitigation policies, and they tend to vary both within and between countries. Based on
data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (N = 44,387), we examined the role of
climate change beliefs and political orientation in explaining worry about climate change
across 23 countries. We show that belief in anthropogenic climate change, followed by
expectations of negative impacts from climate change, are the strongest predictors of
worry about climate change. While the strength of the association between political
orientation and worry about climate change varies across countries, self-positioning
further to the right of the political spectrum is associated with lower levels of worry in
most of the countries included in the analysis. We further show that political orientation
moderates the relationship between climate change beliefs and worry. While increased
confidence in the anthropogenic nature of climate change and expectations of negative
impacts are both associated with increased worry across the political spectrum, the
relationship is weaker among right-leaning as compared to left-leaning individuals.
Notably, the main effect of political orientation on worry about climate change is no
longer statistically significant when the interaction terms are present. Finally, a relatively
small amount of the explained variance in worry is attributable to differences between
countries. The findings might inform strategies for climate change communication in a
European context.
Keywords: worry, beliefs, causes, impacts, climate change, political orientation
INTRODUCTION
Public acceptability is recognized as a key factor for the successful implementation of measures
directed at tackling climate change (de Coninck et al., 2018). Understanding how individuals
perceive climate change can thus be central to mobilizing support for climate policies. Previous
research shows that the extent to which individuals worry about climate change can vary within
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countries in regards to social, cognitive, and cultural factors (Van
der Linden, 2017), but also across countries when considering the
overall level of worry expressed by the general public (Poortinga
et al., 2019). In addition, Poortinga et al. (2019) demonstrated
that the predictive strength of socio-political and demographic
variables in explaining concerns about climate change also differs
across countries and regions. The present study builds upon
that research to shed further light on how public perceptions of
climate change interact with political orientation in a European
context. In particular, we will focus on the relative importance
of and interactions between climate change beliefs and political
orientation in explaining worry about climate change.
Worry is one of several measures used to study climate change
risk perception, sometimes interchangeably with the concepts
of concern, perceived seriousness, and perceived risk. Van der
Linden (2017) proposes that personal worry, generalized concern,
perceived severity, and likelihood ratings are all components of a
“hierarchy of concern,” and that personal worry is the preferred
indicator if the goal is to understand the association with behavior
and/or policy support. In line with this, Van der Linden et al.
(2019) found that personal feelings of worry are associated with
higher levels of support for public action on global warming and
that this association is stronger for worry than for more cognitive
judgments. Smith and Leiserowitz (2014) reported that worry is
a far more important factor in support for climate mitigation
policies than are sociodemographics, cultural worldviews, and
other discrete emotions such as hope or anger. Consequently,
identifying what makes individuals worry about climate change
may help to provide a better understanding of public support and
engagement with the issue.
One factor that is often associated with people’s level of worry
is their beliefs about the causes and possible impacts of climate
change, sometimes referred to as mental models (Bostrom, 2017).
Previous research has shown that people are more likely to report
concern about climate change when they think that humans are
responsible for causing it (Lee et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2016), and
to be more willing to engage in pro-environmental behaviors
and to pay for policies when they think the consequences of
climate change will be severe (Mayer and Smith, 2019). Beliefs
about consequences for humans have been found to be central
to environmental risk perceptions (Böhm and Pfister, 2001) and
several experimental studies support that worry is an especially
likely emotional reaction when focusing on possible negative
consequences of environmental risks (Böhm, 2003; Böhm and
Pfister, 2005). Tobler et al. (2012) reported that, out of several
types of climate change knowledge, knowledge about causes was
most strongly related to climate change concern. Furthermore,
Böhm and Pfister (2017) found that human-caused risks are
more strongly related to moral blameworthiness and emotions
such as outrage than are natural risks, which suggests that causal
attributions are important for evaluations and emotions relating
to environmental risks, including climate change.
Another factor known to be associated with climate change
perceptions is political orientation, which, according to McCright
et al. (2016), constitutes one of the most important and consistent
predictors of climate change perceptions such as worry and
concern. A common approach to measuring political orientation
is to ask people to position themselves on a liberal versus
conservative (in the United States; e.g., American National
Election Studies) or a (political) left versus right (in Europe; e.g.,
European Social Survey) dimension. Research has found that left-
leaning or liberal individuals are more likely to believe in the
reality and anthropogenic nature of climate change, and to be
worried about it, than those who identify themselves as right-
leaning or conservative (for a review, see McCright et al., 2016).
Studies in which individuals place themselves on a liberal-
conservative continuum support this relationship for belief
in anthropogenic climate change (Hornsey et al., 2016) and
environmental concern (Cruz, 2017; Leiserowitz et al., 2019).
Most of these studies were conducted in the United States and
report small- to medium-sized associations. Measuring political
orientation on a left-right continuum in an international context,
Kvaløy et al. (2012) as well as McCright et al. (2015) found
that left-leaning individuals are more likely to perceive climate
change as a serious problem. Doran et al. (2018) found that
political orientation predicted support for climate policies, even
when controlling for consequence beliefs and moral concerns
about climate change. And Poortinga et al. (2019) found a
clear and highly consistent negative association between right-
leaning political orientation and climate change concern using
the same data as used in this paper. Compared to studies from
the United States, studies of European countries have generally
reported weaker associations between political orientation and
climate change views (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; McCright
et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2019). For example, Smith and Mayer
(2018) report that the association between party affiliation,
mapped on a left-right continuum to allow for comparisons
across countries, and perceived danger from climate change
is strongest in English-speaking countries, moderate in non-
English-speaking Western European countries, and minimal in
post-communist states. McCright et al. (2015) found a similar
gap between Western European and former communist countries
with regard to the association between political orientation
and acceptance of anthropogenic climate change, perceived
seriousness, and support for mitigation action.
The ideological differences in climate change concerns
that have been identified in previous research may reflect
motivated reasoning; a process where existing worldviews and
desires influence how individuals interpret available information
(Kunda, 1990; Campbell and Kay, 2014; Lewandowsky and
Oberauer, 2016). In line with this, the theory of cultural
cognition argues that worldviews can make individuals downplay
or highlight risks, and generally perceive them differently
(Kahan, 2012). These theories have often been used to
explain a direct link between political orientation and climate
change views, but they could also explain how political
orientation may interact with climate change beliefs in shaping
perceived risk. While climate skepticism has been found
to be higher among right-leaning individuals (McCright
et al., 2016) most people in Europe—whether left-leaning
or right-leaning—report being at least partly aware of the
anthropogenic causes and possible negative consequences of
climate change (Steentjes et al., 2017; Pohjolainen et al.,
2018). However, political orientation is associated with different
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values and goals (for a review, see Jost et al., 2009) and
thus may direct how information about (the causes and
consequences of) climate change are interpreted. While most
people seem to acknowledge that climate change will have
negative consequences across the world, this could be a more
substantial source of concern for left-leaning individuals (usually
connected to egalitarian values) as compared to right-leaning
individuals (usually connected to individualistic values), as
climate change poses a greater threat to the things they value
(Steg and Sievers, 2000).
Previous research has shown that political orientation can
moderate the relationship between education or self-reported
understanding and climate change concern (for reviews, see
Hamilton, 2011; McCright, 2011). For example, Hamilton (2008)
found that concern about the impacts of climate change on the
polar regions increased with higher levels of education for self-
reported liberals, while it decreased for those who identified
as conservative. Malka et al. (2009) found that higher levels
of self-reported knowledge about climate change were related
to increased concern among self-identified Democrats, while
this was not the case for self-identified Republicans. Similarly,
Guber (2013) found that party polarization regarding worry
about climate change increased with a higher self-reported
understanding of climate change. These studies indicate that
individuals might filter information in a way that aligns with
their ideology (McCright, 2011). However, this line of research
has measured knowledge by asking respondents to indicate
their subjective level of understanding, without tapping into
the actual content of the knowledge. Sinatra and Seyranian
(2015) argue that one can differentiate between unjustified beliefs
and justified true beliefs (supported by scientific evidence and
justified as knowledge). Neither self-reported understanding nor
education necessarily means that the respondents hold justified
true beliefs (knowledge) about climate change. While scientific
information and education can shape beliefs, people’s climate
change beliefs might still differ from the scientific consensus.
In the current paper, we focus on the interaction between
political orientation and people’s beliefs about the causes and
consequences of climate change. While both left-leaning and
right-leaning individuals might hold justified true beliefs about
climate change, we argue that, as a result of motivated reasoning,
such beliefs can lead to different reactions depending on a
person’s political orientation.
The present study adds to the literature addressing public
perceptions of climate change in a European context. We
expect that increased confidence in the anthropogenic nature
of climate change, belief in negative impacts, and a left-
leaning political orientation, are associated with higher levels of
worry. In addition to this, we seek to investigate whether the
associations between beliefs towards and worry about climate
change are contingent on a person’s political orientation. It is
well established that left-leaning individuals are more likely to
endorse responsibility for the environment as a moral value
(Feinberg and Willer, 2013) and to have concerns about the
consequences environmental problems can have on other human
beings and on the natural environment itself (Swami et al.,
2010). We assume that such differences in values and worldviews
may influence to what extent the anthropogenic causes and
global consequences of climate change are deemed important
for people’s risk perception. Consequently, we expect a stronger
relationship between climate change beliefs and worry for
left-leaning than for right-leaning individuals. Accounting for
possible cross-national differences, we expect the association
between political orientation and worry about climate change to
be stronger in Western Europe than in post-communist countries
(Poortinga et al., 2019).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data Collection
This study utilizes data from Round 8 of the European Social
Survey (2016). The data were collected in 2016–2017 through
face-to-face interviews with N = 44,387 respondents from
Israel and 22 European countries. Representative samples of
the population aged 15+ years were drawn from each country,
using strict random probability sampling. The mean age of
the overall sample was 46.97 (SD = 18.85), with 48% males
(n = 24,916) and 52% females (n = 27,226) when adjusted for
post-stratification and population size weights. The items used
in the analysis were taken from the core “Politics” module, as
well as the rotating module on “Climate Change and Energy”
that was included for the first time in Round 8 of the ESS. For
more information on the data, see the documentation report
(European Social Survey, 2018).
Measurements
The dependent variable of the analyses was self-reported worry
about climate change, measured with one item. The respondents
were asked to answer the question “How worried are you about
climate change?” with response categories 1 (Not at all worried),
2 (Not very worried), 3 (Somewhat worried), 4 (Very worried), 5
(Extremely worried). No answer to the question and the category
“Don’t know” were set to missing (n = 1733).
Two questions were asked to assess people’s climate change
beliefs. Beliefs about the causes of climate change were measured
by asking “Do you think that climate change is caused by natural
processes, human activity, or both?,” with answer categories 1
(Entirely by natural processes), 2 (Mainly by natural processes),
3 (About equally by natural processes and human activity), 4
(Mainly by human activity), or 5 (Entirely by human activity). No
answer and the options “I don’t think the climate is changing”
(n = 349) and “Don’t know” (n = 2153), were set to missing.
The variable was treated as continuous and centered around
the grand-mean of M = 3.42. Expectations about the severity
of climate change impacts were assessed by asking “How good
or bad do you think the impact of climate change will be
on people across the world?,” with an 11-point response scale
ranging from 0 (Extremely bad) to 10 (Extremely good). The
response scale was transformed into a dichotomous variable,
coded as 0 (Belief that the impacts will be good or neutral),
including answers from 0 to 5 on the reversed scale, and 1
(Belief in mostly bad impacts), including answers from 6 to 10
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on the reversed scale1. The category “Don’t know” and no
answer was set to missing (n = 3155). Political orientation was
measured by asking respondents: “In politics people sometimes
talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Using this card, where would you place
yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means
the right?” The variable was grand-mean centered (M = 5.16).
A total of 5804 respondents lacked an answer or were in the
category “Don’t know,” which were set to missing. The shares
of missing observations on the left-right scale variable were
considerably higher in post-communist countries in Eastern
and Central Europe than in the remainder of the sample.
Table 1 shows a correlation matrix for the outcome and the
independent variables.
Age, education, and gender were included in the model as
control variables based on associations found in previous studies
(Marquart-Pyatt, 2008; Hornsey et al., 2016; Poortinga et al.,
2019). Gender was dummy coded, with 0 referring to male and
1 to female. Age was treated as a categorical variable with 10-year
intervals, centered on the grand-mean of M = 49.14. Education
had seven categories, representing the highest level of completed
education in line with the International Standard Classification
of Education (ISCED). The categories were 1 (ES-ISCED I /less
than lower secondary), 2 (ES-ISCED II/lower secondary), 3 (ES-
ISCED IIIb/lower tier upper secondary), 4 (ES-ISCED IIIa/upper
tier upper secondary), 5 (ES-ISCED IV/advanced vocational/sub-
degree), 6 (ES-ISCED V1/lower tertiary education/BA level), and
7 (ES-ISCED V2/higher tertiary education/> = MA level).
The variable was grand-mean centered at 4.01. Table 2 shows
descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analyses.
Statistical Analysis
Because people within a country tend to share some features,
accounting for heterogeneous variance can help to gain a
more accurate picture of residuals. Multilevel models (MLM)
accomplish this by dividing the residual variance into within
and between components (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012;
Snijders and Bosker, 2012). We fitted random intercept and
random slope models in order to examine the overall association
and interactions between climate change beliefs, political
orientation, and worry about climate change. The models
comprise two levels that represent individuals (Level 1) nested
within countries (Level 2) and were fitted by using the mixed
command in Stata 15.
Four models were fitted. We started with an unconditional
model (Null Model) followed by a random intercept model with
individual-level variables (Model 1), a model that included the
interactions (Model 2), and a model including a random slope
for political orientation (Model 3). In random intercept models
the regression coefficients are held constant across all groups
(here: countries), while the intercepts are allowed to vary. This
is different from random slope models, where the relationship
between a predictor and the outcome is also allowed to vary
between groups. In the MLM outlined above, it is possible
1Belief about climate change impacts was dichotomized as this study aimed to
distinguish those who think that climate change will have mainly negative impacts
from those who believe in either neutral or mainly positive impacts.
to predict intercepts and slopes for the countries included in
the analysis. However, because countries are treated as random
variables, the models cannot be used to compare actual results
between the countries (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, pp.
158–160). Instead of drawing inferences for specific countries
included in our sample, we seek to generalize the findings to the
total population.
Grand-mean centering was preferred to standardization in
the main models because it does not affect the regression slopes
and residual variances (Hox et al., 2017). We did, however, use
standardization in additional models. The effect size measure
R2 cannot be directly applied to MLM. Instead, we calculated
the proportional reduction of variance (PRV), which has been
recommended to represent the strength of the relationship
between variables in MLM (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012;
Billett et al., 2014; Lorah, 2018). Interaction effects were plotted
and interpreted by using the margins and marginsplot commands
in Stata. Survey weights were not used in the MLM in order to
keep the models parsimonious and comparable.
RESULTS
The amount of the variation in worry that is attributable to
differences between countries was assessed by fitting a null
model without any predictors. The intraclass correlation (ICC)
indicated that about 6% of the total variance in individual-
level worry about climate change is attributable to variation
between countries ICC = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.10]. The ICC were
calculated as the ratio of the country-level variance to the total
variance: ICC = σ2country/(σ2country + σ2individual). Continuing
with MLM rather than one-level models is recommended at this
ICC level to account for a lack of independence (Bliese, 1998;
Hox et al., 2017). The predicted country averages of worry about
climate change are shown in Figure 1.
Results from likelihood ratio tests confirmed that the model
with individual-level variables (Model 1) has a better fit than the
unconditional (‘null’) model χ2(6) = 4821.69, p < 0.001. Model 1
shows that belief in the anthropogenic nature of climate change
and negative impacts on people across the world were associated
with more worry, while right-leaning political orientation was
associated with less worry (see Table 3).
A model including the interaction terms between climate
change beliefs and political orientation (Model 2) further
improved the fit, χ2(2) = 63.58, p < 0.001. The interactions
between beliefs about climate change causes and political
orientation and between expected climate change impacts and
political orientation were both statistically significant. As seen
in Table 3, the main effect of political orientation was no longer
statistically significant after adding the interactions.
The final model (Model 3) included a random slope on
political orientation, which again led to an improvement of model
fit, χ2(2) = 21.15, p < 0.001. In this model, increased worry
was predicted by belief in anthropogenic climate change and
negative impacts. The main effect of political orientation was
not statistically significant, just as in Model 2. The interaction
between beliefs about climate change causes and political
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TABLE 1 | Correlation matrix.
Worry about climate change Climate change attribution Climate change impact Political orientation
Worry about climate change 1.00
Climate change attribution 0.30** 1.00
Climate change impact 0.29** 0.24** 1.00
Political orientation −0.11** −0.10** −0.12** 1.00
**Correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). Weighted with a combination of post-stratification weight and population weight.
TABLE 2 | Descriptive Statistics for variables in the study.
Individual-level (N = 44 387) M SD Min Max
Worry about climate change (1 = Not at all worried; 5 = Extremely worried) 3.06 0.94 1 5
Climate change attribution (1 = Entirely by natural processes; 5 = Entirely by human activity) 3.42 0.83 1 5
Climate change impact (0 = Extremely good; 10 = Extremely bad) 6.80 2.19 0 10
Political orientation (0 = Left; 10 = Right) 4.99 2.18 0 10
Age 46.97 18.85 15 100
Gender (Female) 0.52 0.50 0 1
Education 3.78 1.82 1 7
Country-level (N = 23)
All variables are weighted with a combination of post-stratification weight and population weight.
FIGURE 1 | Mean worry by country. Weighted with a combination of post-stratification weight and population weight.
orientation and between beliefs about climate change impacts
and political orientation were both still statistically significant.
The intercept-slope covariance was not statistically significant,
thus including the correlation estimate did not improve the
model. The effects of the three control variables age, gender,
and education were highly consistent throughout the models.
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TABLE 3 | Model results.
Null Model Model 1 (Level 1
variables)
Model 2
(interactions)
Model 3 (random slope)
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Fixed coefficients
Intercept 3.07 (0.05) 2.78 (0.04) 2.77 (0.04) 2.78 (0.04)
Climate change attribution 0.29 (0.01)*** 0.29 (0.01)*** 0.28 (0.01)***
Climate change impact 0.31 (0.01)*** 0.32 (0.01)*** 0.32 (0.01)***
Political orientation −0.03 (0.00)*** −0.01 (0.00) −0.01 (0.00)
Climate change attribution∗political orientation −0.01 (0.00)** −0.01 (0.00)**
Climate change impact∗political orientation −0.03 (0.00)*** −0.03 (0.00)***
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Gender (Female) 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.12 (0.01)***
Education 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)***
Random parameters (error variance)
Level 2: Country 0.05 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Level 2: Political orientation 0.00 (0.00)
Level 1: Individual 0.77 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01) 0.67 (0.01) 0.67 (0.01)
Log likelihood −46,111.858 −43,701.011 −43,669.223 −43,658.649
AIC 92,229.72 87,420.03 87,360.45 87,343.3
Variance explained by covariates ICC = 0.06,
95% CI [0.03,0.10]
Pseudo R2 = 0.138
R22 = 0.329
R12 = 0.126
Pseudo R2 = 0.140
R22 = 0.332
R12 = 0.128
Pseudo R2 = 0.141
R22 = 0.334 R12 = 0.129
ICC = 0.05, 95% CI [0.03,0.08]
All variables are grand-mean centered, except gender (0 = Male; 1 = Female) and impact (0 = Good; 1 = Bad). ∗∗Statistically significant at the p = 0.001 level, ∗∗∗statistically
significant at the p < 0.001 level. Total R-squared and separate reduction of variance are calculated following the method used in Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012).
N = 35,690 individuals, N = 23 countries.
FIGURE 2 | Interaction 1: Climate change attribution∗political orientation. Predictive probabilities for increased worry about climate change. The different categories
of individual political orientation equal furthest left, center, and furthest right on the 11-point continuum. All other predictors are at their observed values.
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FIGURE 3 | Interaction 2: Climate change impact∗political orientation. Predictive probabilities for increased worry about climate change. The different categories of
political orientation equal furthest left, center, and furthest right on the 11-point continuum. All other predictors are at their observed values.
Table 3 shows that age was not statistically significant in any
of the models, while higher levels of education were related
to increased worry and women were more worried than men
across all models.
The interaction between political orientation and beliefs about
climate change causes (see Figure 2) suggests that thinking
that climate change is caused by human activity is associated
with increased worry, independently of political orientation. The
relationship was statistically significant for individuals furthest
left (B = 0.33 (01), z = 22.81, p < 0.001 CI [0.30, 0.35]), center
(B = 0.29 (0.01), z = 48.68, p < 0.001 CI [0.27, 0.30]), and furthest
right (B = 0.25 (0.01), z = 18.75, p < 0.001 CI [0.22, 0.27]) on
the spectrum. However, the strongest effect was found for those
furthest left, followed by center and furthest right. There were no
differences in worry between the three groups for individuals who
believe climate change is caused entirely by natural processes.
The interaction between political orientation and climate
change impacts (see Figure 3) indicate that there is no difference
in worry between people who place themselves on the political
scale furthest to the left, center, or furthest to the right if they
believe that the impacts of climate change will be neutral or
mostly good. In contrast, worry increased for all three groups
when individuals believe that the impacts will be negative across
the world, and a gap between the political positions becomes
apparent. The positive relationship between belief in negative
impacts and worry about climate change was largest for people
furthest to the left (B = 0.46 (0.03), z = 17.58, p < 0.001, CI [0.41,
0.51]), followed by people in the center (B = 0.32 (0.01), z = 31.61,
p < 0.001, CI [0.30, 0.34]), and smallest for people furthest to the
right (B = 0.18 (0.02), z = 7.65, p < 0.001, CI [0.13, 0.23]).
Figure 4 shows the predicted slopes for political orientation
across countries, with all covariates included in the model. The
random slopes can be thought of as an interaction between
individual-level political orientation and country. The figure
shows that the effect of right-leaning political orientation on
worry is negative across most countries, but the strength of the
effect varies. Consistent with our expectations, the relationship is
generally stronger for Western European countries compared to
post-communist states. In Italy and some of the post-communist
countries, the slopes indicate a positive relationship.
In order to get comparable effect sizes, we refitted Model 1
with standardized versions of the predictors. Standardization was
done following recommendations for calculating effect sizes for
fixed effects in MLM (Lorah, 2018). The standardized coefficient
for climate change causation was β = 0.23 (p < 0.001), for
belief in negative impacts β = 0.14 (p < 0.001), and for
political orientation β = −0.06 (p < 0.001), education (β = 0.05,
p < 0.001), and gender (β = 0.06, p < 0.001). The same
pattern was found in the final model (Model 3), where the
standardized coefficient for climate change causes were β = 0.23
(p < 0.001), for belief in negative impacts β = 0.14 (p < 0.001),
and for political orientation β = −0.08 (p < 0.001), education
(β = 0.04, p < 0.001), and gender (β = 0.06, p < 0.001).
In addition to standardization, effect sizes were indicated by
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FIGURE 4 | Predicted average slope of political orientation on worry about climate change for each country combined with country-specific intercepts. Austria AT,
Belgium BE, Switzerland CH, Czech Republic CZ, Germany DE, Estonia EE, Spain ES, Finland FI, France FR, United Kingdom GB, Hungary HU, Ireland IE, Israel IL,
Iceland IS, Italy IT, Lithuania LT, Netherlands NL, Norway NO, Poland PL, Portugal PT, Russian Federation RU, Sweden SE, Slovenia SI.
the PRV for each predictor, PRV = (varmodel excluding one predictor
− varmodel including all predictors)/varmodel excluding one predictor (Billett
et al., 2014). The results from refitting Model 1 three times,
each time excluding one of the main predictors, indicated that
beliefs about climate change causes had the biggest impact out
of the covariates (PRV = 0.07), followed by belief in negative
impacts (PRV = 0.03). Political orientation did not have a
measurable distinct direct contribution. The same results was
found for Model 3.
The overall PRV is here referred to as Pseudo R2 and calculated
by following the recommendations from Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal (2012). By first comparing the unconditional model
with Model 1, we see that the covariates in total explained about
14% of the variance in worry about climate change (Total Pseudo
R2 = 0.138). The final model (Model 3), including interactions
and a random slope, still explained approximately 14% of the
variance (Total Pseudo R2 = 0.141).
In the final model, about 5% of the variance in worry was
attributable to differences between countries ICC = 0.05, 95%
CI [0.03, 0.08] compared to 6% in the Null Model ICC = 0.06,
95% CI [0.03, 0.10]. This means that compositional differences
in the individual-level variables explained only a small amount of
Level 2 variance.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the overall association between belief
in anthropogenic climate change, impact evaluations, political
orientation on the one hand and worry about climate
change on the other. Because climate change risk perception
might be influenced by country-contexts, we further explored
possible group effects. Our results indicate that differences
between countries explain a relatively small proportion of
worry about climate change. One reason might be that there
is too much variation within countries to reveal strong
contextual effects. For example, prior research has found
regional differences in actual and perceived vulnerability to
climate change impacts, such as flooding (Brody et al.,
2008). This implies that smaller areas, such as municipality
or city, might be more suitable to account for possible
cluster differences.
In line with prior studies (Lee et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2016),
our results indicate that recognizing the human causes of climate
change predicts worry. This could be because risks perceived to
be human-caused are associated with greater feelings of moral
responsibility compared to naturally occurring risks (Böhm and
Pfister, 2017). According to the standardized coefficients and
the PRV, beliefs about climate change causes had the largest
effect out of the predictors. The second largest effect was that
of belief in negative impacts. The results showed a positive
relationship between belief in negative impacts of climate change
and reported levels of worry, which supports prior findings
(Böhm and Pfister, 2005; Mayer and Smith, 2019). Research
conducted on the concept of psychological distance has indicated
that asking about impacts “on people across the world” can have
a weaker relation to worry compared to questions about impacts
that are geographically and socially close (Spence et al., 2012). It is
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1573
fpsyg-11-01573 July 14, 2020 Time: 17:45 # 9
Gregersen et al. Worry About Climate Change
thus possible that the strength of the relationship between belief
in negative impacts and worry about climate change would have
been stronger if the question had been framed differently.
Moreover, the predictive power of climate change beliefs on
worry was substantially stronger compared to differences in
political orientation. The fact that the strength of the association
between political orientation and worry differs across countries is
likely a partial explanation for the weaker main effect. It should
be noted that even though the effect varies, the results indicate
that the direction of the relationship is consistent across most
countries. Specifically, individuals located further right on the
political spectrum generally report being less worried than those
further to the left. The reason for the cross-national variation
could be explained with the anti-reflexivity thesis, which can also
explain why political orientation seems to have more predictive
power in the United States (McCright, 2011; McCright et al.,
2016) compared to Europe (McCright et al., 2015; Smith and
Mayer, 2018; Poortinga et al., 2019).
The anti-reflexivity thesis, often used to explain climate
change skepticism, upholds that right-leaning individuals,
organizations, and political parties seek to defend the capitalist
system, which can be threatened by the need for climate change
mitigation (McCright, 2016). Conservative think tanks and anti-
reflexivity movements have been especially visible and robust
in the United States (McCright et al., 2016). A consequence
of these movements could be perceptions of weaker social
and scientific consensus concerning the causes and possible
consequences of climate change. This is important because prior
research indicates that perceived consensus can reduce the gap
in reported worry about climate change between the political
left and right. For example, Goldberg et al. (2019) found that
the relationship between conservative leanings and self-reported
worry was, while still existent, substantially less negative for
individuals that reported high social consensus among family and
friends. Similar results have been found for perceived scientific
consensus (Van der Linden et al., 2019).
The fact that the direct association between political
orientation and worry is no longer statistically significant when
the interactions are present indicates that, rather than it having
a direct influence, political orientation alters the relationship
between climate change beliefs and worry. Our results show that
belief in anthropogenic climate change and its negative impacts
on people across the world is more strongly related to worry for
left-leaning individuals than for right-leaning individuals. The
differences are in line with motivated reasoning, and are plausible
when considering typical interests, values, and worldviews within
left-leaning versus right-leaning political orientation (Jost et al.,
2003; Jost et al., 2009; Balliet et al., 2018). For example,
asking specifically for possible worldwide consequences of climate
change could prime egalitarian values often related to the political
left, as opposed to the more individualistic values found on
the political right. Consequently, left-leaning individuals might
emphasize global risks more than those furthest right on the
political spectrum. In line with this, Hart and Nisbet (2012)
found that messages that include social distance cues can increase
polarization in policy preferences. While positive attitudes
toward climate change mitigation policies were independent of
whether the potential victims were local or foreign for self-
identified Democrats, high social distance reduced policy support
among self-identified Republicans. It is important to mention
that, though somewhat weaker, the relationship between climate
change beliefs and worry are still positive also for right-leaning
individuals. Further, there are no differences between the political
groups for individuals that believe either that the causation of
climate change is entirely natural, or that the impacts will be
neutral or good.
Future research including political orientation may need to
consider more closely what is meant by “left” and “right” because
the effect of political orientation might depend on what these
labels represent. The meaning of the labels may vary across
countries and even across different groups within countries, and
they may signify variation on different dimensions. For example,
Caughey et al. (2019) distinguish between economic, social, and
immigration-related conservatism and progressivism in Europe,
and find that on average, citizens of Northern Europe tend to be
more progressive (left-leaning) on immigration and social issues
but more conservative (right-leaning) on economic issues than
their Southern and Eastern European counterparts. The cross-
country difference found in the present study, and previously
by Smith and Mayer (2018) and McCright et al. (2015) may
thus in part relate to the fact that the left-right scale structures
party competition in different countries in different ways. More
specifically, the difference between post-communist countries
and other democracies may be due to a potentially weaker role of
ideological debate along a left-right scale. The data on the share of
respondents positioning themselves on a left-right scale suggest
a somewhat lower relevance of the left-right scale in Eastern
European countries than in Western Europe (Dalton et al., 2011).
This is an important limitation because whether respondents
think of left and right in economic rather than social terms
may matter for the effect of this construct on their perceptions
about climate change.
Some other limitations of the current study should be noted,
especially in terms of measurement. First, the reported analyses
employed single-item measures for the investigated constructs,
which can influence their validity. From a theoretical perspective,
worry is a personal emotional reaction to a perceived threat and
should motivate behavior aimed at reducing the risk (Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017). Our findings do not
provide any details about what aspects or impacts of climate
change people worry about, and whether this differs within
or across countries. Previous research has shown that group
membership can influence perceptions of environmental issues
(Song et al., 2020) and it is likely that left-leaning and right-
leaning individuals may worry about different threats. Further,
the data provide no insights into how individuals prioritize the
issue of climate change compared to other societal issues. Studies
using open-ended and unprompted questions to investigate the
relative importance of climate change have found climate change
to have a relatively low relevance compared to other issues, and
that its importance differs across countries (Steentjes et al., 2017).
An unspecific understanding of what it means when people say
they are “worried” about climate change may limit the practical
relevance of the relationship between climate change beliefs
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and worry. Finally, since the reported analyses were based
on cross-sectional data, interpretations about causal directions
of the identified relationships have to be made with caution.
For example, the relationship between climate change beliefs
and worry could be spurious, with a confounding factor
explaining their association. Furthermore, while the current
paper assumes that climate change beliefs affect worry, it is
also possible that worry affects climate change beliefs. Worrying
about climate change may stimulate information seeking (Mead
et al., 2012) which could increase knowledge about the causes
and impacts of climate change. We thus see the investigation
of the content of people’s worries and the direction of the
relationship between beliefs and worry as fruitful avenues for
future research.
CONCLUSION
The current study finds that political orientation alters
the association between climate change beliefs and worry.
Specifically, believing that climate change is caused by humans
and will have negative impacts across the world is a more
potent source of worry for left-leaning than for right-leaning
individuals. The findings might help inform strategies for
international climate communication. While focusing on more
knowledge and acceptance of anthropogenic climate change
remains an important factor across European countries, relying
solely on an increase in information is likely not the most
effective measure. Instead, communication efforts should take
into account that political orientation might influence how beliefs
about the causes and consequences of climate change relate
to worry. One way to deal with this is to consider relevant
worldviews and values within different political orientations
and tailor messages accordingly. For example, if the goal is
to target individuals with a right-leaning political orientation,
focusing on the possible economic or local consequences
of climate change might work better than global framings.
Further, such climate change information might be more
effective if communicated and supported by diverse political
elites and advocacy groups (Brulle et al., 2012). Previous
research suggests that perceived consensus is highly relevant
and that messages about social and scientific consensus can
affect worry both directly and indirectly through increased
confidence in the anthropogenic character of climate change
(Van der Linden et al., 2015, 2019).
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